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ARTICLE
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Regulation: Achieving Food Integrity
Through Cap-and-Trade Models from
Climate Policy for GMO Regulation
GABRIELA STEIER, ESQ.*
Apathy can be overcome by enthusiasm, and enthusiasm can
only be aroused by two things: first, an ideal, which takes the
imagination by storm, and second, a definite intelligible plan for
carrying that ideal into practice.
- Arnold J. Toynbee
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I.

INTRODUCTION

American-patented commodity crops have taken the European
market by storm. With an increase of GMO imports, genetically
engineered (GE) corn, rice, wheat, and soy have flooded the
European Union (EU). GMOs are difficult to detect once introduced
into ecosystems,1 and they become inextricably intertwined with
local biodiversity. In deliberations about approving GE crops,
policy makers chose to ban GMOs in order to protect the European
1. Reliable, Standardised, Specific, Quantitative Detection of Genetically
Modified Food, in A DECADE OF EU-FUNDED GMO RESEARCH (2001-2010), at 150
(2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20130805192627/http://ec.europa.eu/research
/biosociety/pdf/a_decade_of_eu-funded_gmo_research.pdf [https://perma.cc/5954V2AB].
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food system and its ecosystem until GMOs are proven safe.2
European experts have given equal weight to the food safety and
environmental impact of genetically engineered organisms
(GMOs),3 urging legislators to take sustainability, benefits, and
impact on society into account. This balance of priorities is a clash
between the prolific commercialization of GMOs and the free trade
position of the US, and the precautionary and protectionist
approach of the EU and its member states, wary of the risks that
GMOs bring along. However, international trade pressures the EU
to open its gates to even more GMO imports and possibly to
cultivation of GE crops.4 How could the EU fight back?
Changing US law on GMO approvals along with the
confounding and shared regulation of the executive branch’s
agencies is beyond realistic, permitting uncountable GMOs to be
farmed and exported to the EU. However, a cap-and-trade model
borrowed from climate change policy may help the EU to protect
its member states from GMOs and the associated food safety and
environmental risks by slightly altering trade. Essentially, if you
can alter the trade, you can alter the practice,5 as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has shown.6 The reverse is also true and
evident from the proliferation of GMOs in commodity crop
agriculture, representing the practice, altered by the potential to
export and, thereby, trade GMOs widely.7 The goal of this paper is
to explore and contextualize potential regulatory mechanisms
2. Transboundary Movements, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/
gmo/transboundary_en [https://perma.cc/XJR8-2JMG] (“Regulation (EC) 1946/
2003 regulates transboundary movements of GMOs and transposes the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety into EU law.”).
3. European Network on Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Food
Crops, in A DECADE OF EU-FUNDED GMO RESEARCH (2001-2010), supra note 1, at
142, 148.
4. Gabriela Steier, Trivialization Through Proliferation: Genetically
Engineered Food, Urban Agriculture, and Climate Change Mitigation for
Improved Food Security in EU-US Trade (forthcoming).
5. The author thanks Professor Pamela Vesilind for extracting this essential
insight and for her support and guidance with this paper.
6. Steier, supra note 4; see also What is the Role of the Multilateral Trading
System on World Food Prices?, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2009), https://www.wto.org/
english/forums_e/debates_e/debate18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/RFF7-9DZG].
7. Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV.,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered
-crops-in-the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/X73L-SY83] (last
updated Nov. 3, 2016).
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borrowed from climate change policy to examine conceivable
regulatory controls of the spread of Genetically Modified (GM)
crops as a safeguard of environmental integrity and food
“integrity.”8 Food systems can benefit from borrowing a cap-andtrade scheme from climate change regulation for a bottom-up
market-based (as opposed to government top-down) regulation of
GMOs to make room for crop diversification, thereby triggering a
positive ripple effect for agro-ecosystems, food safety and security,
and food policy in the US.
A. GMOs as Links of a Centralized Food System
GMOs are the links of our centralized food system, largely
dependent on international trade. The Agricultural Market
Information System, a network to which most large food-producing
countries subscribe, uses the GE commodity crops of corn, wheat,
soy, and rice as key market indicators,9 providing data to umbrella
organizations that determine global policy, such as the WTO and
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO).10 Moreover, the well-known Cornucopia Institute’s diagram
based on Michigan State’s Professor Phil Howard’s research
visualizes that the seeds are ultimately owned by the major plant
patent holders, Monsanto, DuPont, Bayer, Syngenta, Dow, and
BASF.11 These multi-national agricultural companies (hereinafter
BigAg), dominate both markets and agriculture lobbies, thereby
exerting tremendous pressure on legislators and policy holders to
eliminate market barriers, maintain trade paths that allow these
companies to grow bigger, and boost their bottom lines.12 Recently,

8. Food integrity shall be defined as the measure of environmental
sustainability and climate change resilience, combined with food safety, security,
and sovereignty for the farm-to-fork production and distribution of any food
product.
9. Supply & Demand, AGRIC. MKT. INFO. SYS., http://www.amis-outlook.org/
amis-monitoring/supply-demand/overview/en/ [https://perma.cc/AE63-SY2H].
10. Food Security, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
agric_e/food_security_e.htm#amis [https://perma.cc/D2QQ-ALUE].
11. Phil Howard, Seed Industry Structure 1996-2013, CORNUCOPIA INST.,
https://www.cornucopia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/seedindustry.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2Q9-7T9B]; see infra Figure 1.
12. Amy Mayer, Why You Should Care About ‘Big Ag’ Companies Getting
Bigger, CIVIL EATS (Oct. 31, 2016), http://civileats.com/2016/10/31/why-you-should
-care-about-big-ag-companies-getting-bigger/ [https://perma.cc/6YML-HQKS].
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these companies have come together to form even larger
conglomerates, creating power distortions that may, as reports
warn, “trigger structural changes to the foundations of our food
system and impact all Americans, whether or not they buy seeds,
fertilizer or herbicides.”13 As such, the consolidation of food
systems, owned by BigAg and scrutinized by trade-oriented bodies
such as the WTO, leave barely any room for considerations of food
safety, consumer protection, environmental integrity, and overall
food integrity. Here, food integrity shall be coined as a measure of
environmental sustainability and climate change resilience,
combined with food safety, security, and sovereignty for the farmto-fork production and distribution of any food product.
The quantity of GMO production and export are key indicators
that commodity crops have become an economy of scale – a scale
that goes beyond country borders,14 across jurisdictions,15 above
and beyond international treaties,16 and past the planet’s capacity,
depleting its resources and work force.17 As biotechnology has
drastically changed American agriculture,18 the necessary
regulations have not kept up. An estimated 70 percent of food sold
at grocery stores contains GM ingredients.19 Although 88 million
acres of GM crops are being cultivated in the US, their
environmental, public health, and economic implications remain

13. Id.
14. See generally WORLD TRADE ORG., PRICE VOLATILITY IN FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL MARKETS: POLICY RESPONSES (2011), https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news11_e/igo_10jun11_report_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT8E-XSMM].
15. See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard Act of 2016, Pub.
L. No. 114-216, § 764, 130 Stat. 834 (2016) (also called the DARK Act); see also
Michal Addady, President Obama Signed This GMO Labeling Bill, FORTUNE (July
31, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/31/gmo-labeling-bill/ [https://perma.cc/PVN
2-YXFP].
16. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
17. Fredrik Moberg, et al., How to Feed Nine Billion within the Planet’s
Boundaries: The Need for an Agroecological Approach, SWEDISH INT’L AGRIC.
NETWORK INITIATIVE (Mar. 2015), http://www.siani.se/sites/clients.codepositive.
com/files/document/siani_agroecology_brief_march_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/R35V4CFU].
18. Jason J. Czarnezki & Emily Montgomery, Genetically Modified
Organisms and the Environment, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 93, 93 (Mary Jane Angelo et al. eds., 2013).
19. Id.
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uncertain at best.20 Capping the ever-growing trade of GE crops
might be a viable solution to interrupt the flux of environmentally
harmful and risky foods along the trade lines of commodity crops.
This paper proposes such a cap-and-trade model and explores the
environmental repercussions of the widespread GM crop
agriculture. The goal of this paper is to explore regulatory
mechanisms borrowed from climate change policy to examine
potential regulatory controls of the spread of GM crops as a
safeguard of environmental integrity.21
B. GMO Regulation Under a Climate Change Regulatory
Model
Food systems can benefit from borrowing a cap-and-trade
scheme from climate change regulation for a bottom-up marketbased regulation of GMOs to make room for crop diversification to
promote food integrity. The novelty of this idea lies in the inwardpointing regulatory approach where international policy may help
the US catch up with domestic food policy. Although, the
regulation of GMOs is an issue that many have written about
before,22 putting GMO regulation under a climate change
regulatory approach in the context of capping international trade
of the most traded GMO commodity crops, is a new twist that
combines both problems into a proactive solution.
The proposed solution, despite the vast amount of literature
on point, is non-obvious. In climate change regulation, cap-andtrade schemes are well-known, but their applicability to agroecosystems, however, has barely been covered in the literature and

20. Id.
21. Although GM crops are closely related to GM animals in agriculture, GM
animals are beyond the scope of this paper.
22. See, e.g., A. Bryan Endres & Lisa Schlessinger, Pollen Drift: Reframing
the Biotechnology Liability Debate, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 815 (2014); Bernd van
der Meulen & Neshe Yusuf, One-Door-One-Key Principle: Observations Regarding
Integration of GM Authorization Procedures in the EU, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 877
(2014); Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: Why
Institutional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y. 1 (2008); Cara V. Coburn, Comment, Out of the Petri Dish and Back to the
People: A Cultural Approach to GMO Policy, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 283 (2005);
Elizabeth G. Hill, Comment, Nature’s Harvest or Man’s Profit: Environmental
Shortcuts in the Deregulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV.
353 (2012).
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certainly not from a legal point of view. Borrowing climate change
regulation for food systems is a practical idea because agriculture
should not be separated (through agricultural exceptionalism as
explained below) from environmental considerations and, thereby,
climate change considerations. Thus, agro-ecology is the
sustainable counterpart to industrial monocultures and GE
cropping.
Finally, considering how a cap-and-trade system might apply
to food systems is a useful start for policy makers and supplies a
basis for further discourse. This paper takes issues left open—h ow
GMOs and climate change should be regulated—in legal literature,
and combines them by zooming in on one particular tangent,
namely food trade. Correspondingly, food trade regulation could be
a powerful tool to unleash or disrupt the centralized food system
by capping commodity crop trade, and thereby discouraging
unsustainable GE cropping, thus redistributing resources and
opening trade routes for agro-ecologically produced alternatives to
commodity crops. This ripple effect may serve to decentralize food
systems and invigorate local supply chains, which has predictably
positive environmental outcomes, such as reduced food miles, less
fossil fuel dependence, improved crop diversity, and even a more
varied food supply produced at greater transparency to improve
food safety and security in the best case scenarios.23
C. Trans-Atlantic Comparison: US-American Free Trade
and European Precautionary Protectionism
This paper takes a comparative law approach, borrowing from
climate change policy on the one hand, and from related legal
systems, on the other. The functionality principle from modern
comparative law24 informs the methodology in this paper by
examining the concrete problem of how GMOs can be regulated in
international trade. Comparing the EU to the US approaches
serves to juxtapose two extremes: the free trade (US) and the
protectionist (EU) approach of GMO trade regulation.

23. See Moberg et al., supra note 17; Gabriela Steier, Small Farmers Cool the
Planet- The Case for Rights-Based International Agroecological Law, 4(2)
GRONINGEN J. INT’L. L. 1 (2016).
24. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEINRICH KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 34-35 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2011).
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Additionally, in borrowing the cap-and-trade model from climate
change policy, this policy proposes mechanisms to close some
loopholes established through agricultural exceptionalism from a
food law approach, as explained in Part 3. Resulting from this
climate change policy extension to agricultural trade, food systems
may find more sustainable and environmentally friendly
alternatives that decentralize and open-up trade on a global scale.
The structure of US law has not yielded a GMO regulatory
framework as sustainable and environmentally friendly as in the
EU, despite extensive regulation of the food and agricultural
sector. States have started to require labeling of GMOs as a
consumer protection scheme,25 but the BigAg lobby continues to be
so powerful that additional legislation may be obsolete. Thus,
assuming that additional GMO regulation on a federal level is a
solution beyond the scope of this paper, one may envision trying
the market-based approach, capping the amount of GMOs that can
be traded. Zooming further in on the GMO market, commodity
crops compose the primary traded crops26 and, therefore, lend
themselves to being a test group for such a cap-and trade scheme.
In 2016-2017, according to USDA-FAS data, the US alone
dominates world production with 386.7 million metric tonnes of
corn (nearly 60 percent globally), 474 of milled rice (98.5 percent
globally), and 688.4 of wheat (about 91.6 percent globally).27 The
EU imports large quantities of oilseeds, animal feedstuffs, and rice,
according to the WTO’s tariffs and duty regulations.28 Competing
with the US, “wheat is by far the most popular cereal grown in the
EU, making up nearly half the total[,]” with corn and barley each
making up another third.29 As such, comparing the US and EU
25. For a list of states requiring GMO labeling, see GMO Labeling Isn’t Dead:
See Which States Are Leading the Fight, JUST LABEL IT!, http://www.justlabelit.
org/press-center/press-items/gmo-labeling-isnt-dead-see-which-states-areleading-the-fight [https://perma.cc/Z53S-5N3Y].
26. Jeff Daniels, Agriculture Commodity Traders See a Good 2017, Despite
Possible Demand Risks, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2017, 4:07 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/
2017/01/03/agriculture-commodity-traders-see-a-good-2017-despite-possibledemand-risks.html [https://perma.cc/5ELC-K93Y].
27. Estimated calculation based on FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., All Grain
Summary Comparison, in GRAIN: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE 3 (2017), https://
apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/grain.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT4W-HFVH].
28. Cereals, Oilseeds and Protein Crops, Rice, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.
europa.eu/agriculture/cereals_en [https://perma.cc/DQ5T-M6VK].
29. Id.
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commodity crop trade schemes may be quite revealing as globally
dominant forces with international impact on the agricultural
sector.
From the onset, however, the clashes of the US-American and
European legal systems must be accounted for from a
comparativist perspective. Following the negative aspect of the
functionality principle30 in this comparative analysis, “sources of
law” are “whatever molds or affects the living law in [the] chosen
system.”31 Simply put, the author strives to think creatively,
eradicating the preconception and investigating the positive
aspects of the European and US-American legal systems compared
herein, to find an analogy to the solution of interest, i.e. the forced
diversification of crops to weaken GMO proliferation through US
exports.32 The premise for this methodology is that of Ernst Rabel,
an internationally renowned comparativist, finding that “social,
economic and legal fields interact[]” to shape political and legal
ideals.33 Here, the ideals point toward more sustainable and
resilient food production of diversified crops. Underlying this
approach is a simple premise: for sustainable agricultural systems
to feed future populations, GMOs must be heavily regulated and
stopped from flooding the international crop markets. Diversifying
the crop trade of the major producers and importers, the US and
the EU respectively, illustrates which legal tools can be targeted
to achieve these goals. Using cap-and-trade methods from
greenhouse gas (GHG) trading models in climate change policy
provides an imaginable upstream regulatory model. Finally,
choosing a comparison of the EU and the US systems is merely a
trans-Atlantic geographical limitation to deepen the analysis of the
US - from where many GMOs originate, on the one hand, and the
EU - of the most resistant governments to GMOs, on the other
hand. Then, an explanation of the clash between free trade and
protectionist perceptions create a basis for the subsequent context
of international GMO trade, as well as its environmental and food
safety risks.
In Part 1, the pertinent risks of genetically engineered crops
are contrasted to conventionally bred counterparts, clarifying
30.
31.
32.
33.

ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 24, at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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common misconceptions and highlighting the need for improved
regulation. Concepts of food policy and macroeconomics, such as
free trade and protectionism, are briefly introduced by way of
background information for the following legal analysis. Then,
Part 2 identifies the problematic risks of GMO under-regulation,
namely uncontrolled environmental harm and food insecurity.
Explaining how agricultural exceptionalism enables the USAmerican free-trade approach to GMO regulation, prioritizes
profitability of agriculture over other important considerations,
such as public health, socio-economic and direct and indirect
environmental effects. Part 3 proposes a solution, a cap-and-trade
upstream regulation of GMOs borrowed from climate change
policy. The applicability to the US is explored in context of paragon
directives from the EU on GMO regulation. Notably, in conceding
that the US GMO regulatory policy does not exist in a vacuum, this
paper takes a comparative law approach, contrasting the US free
trade against the EU protectionism and precautionary models,
evaluating both with the goal to extract a cap-and-trade model
suitable for the US and concludes with an evaluation of the
proposed model.
II. SETTING UP THE MODEL: MISCONCEPTIONS
AND KNOWLEDGE GAPS
A. Genetically Engineered Versus Conventionally Bred
Crops
To clarify common misconceptions from the onset, genetically
engineered crops do not occur in nature and are inherently
“unnatural” because they cross species barriers and are designed
to be mass-produced in industrial agricultural schemes.
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), also known as
Genetically Engineered (GE) or Genetically Modified (GM) crops
are widely understood to be modified to give desired traits through
biotechnology of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA).34 In
contrast, conventional breeding includes other methods, such as
selective breeding, crossing, and interspecies hybridization.35 The
34. NEIL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
277 (Wiley & Sons eds., 2d ed. 2016).
35. Id.
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relevant difference between genetic engineering and conventional
breeding for this paper is that GE plants are specifically
engineered to industrial agriculture, cultivation in monocultures,
and thereby, highly resource-intensive and environmentally
harmful practices.36
There are several types of GE crops, such as, among others,
herbicide resistant (HT) and insect resistant (Bt) varieties, which
are abundant in the US.37 According to the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA), HT crops have been “developed to survive
application of specific herbicides that previously would have
destroyed the crop along with the targeted weeds.”38 Their alleged
benefit is that they “provide farmers with a broader variety of
options for effective weed control.”39 The other common type of GE
crops are insect-resistant crops, defined by the USDA as those
crops “containing the gene from the soil bacterium Bt (Bacillus
thuringiensis),” which “produce a protein that is toxic to specific
insects, protecting the plant over its entire life.”40
Projected spread for GE Crop Cultivation in the US is usually
measured by acreages planted with these crops.41 So-called
“stacked” varieties of cotton and corn, which have both HT and Bt
traits, have accelerated in recent years, with stacked corn
accounting for up 76 percent of corn acres in 2016.42 According to
the USDA-ERS, “GE soybean adoption rates reached 94 percent in
2016 (soybeans have only HT varieties). Adoption of all GE corn
accounted for 92 percent of corn acreage in 2016.”43 A European
multi-disciplinary investigation of the possible negative effects on
the biodiversity of non-target insects in and around fields of Bt
crops that have fuelled growing public and political concerns, found
that pollinator, predator, and other arthropod biodiversity were
affected.44
36. See generally Czarnezki & Montgomery, supra note 18.
37. Recent Trends in GE Adoption, supra note 7.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The spread of GE crops is rising. See infra Figure 1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Effects and Mechanisms of Bt Transgenes on Biodiversity of Non-Target
Insects: Pollinators, Herbivores and Their Natural Enemies, in A DECADE OF EUFUNDED GMO RESEARCH (2001-2010), supra note 1, at 52.
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Figure 1: Adoption of GE crops in the US.45

The USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) reports that “HT
soybeans went from 17 percent of U.S. soybean acreage in 1997
to . . . 94 percent in 2014, 2015, and 2016. Plantings of HT cotton
expanded from about 10 percent of U.S. acreage in 1997 to . . . 89
percent in 2015 and 2016.”46 Moreover, “[p]lantings of Bt corn grew
from about 8 percent of U.S. corn acreage in 1997 to . . . 79 percent
in 2016. . . . Plantings of Bt cotton also expanded rapidly, from 15
percent of U.S. cotton acreage in 1997 to . . . 84 percent in 2014,
2015, and 2016.”47

45. Figure reprinted from Recent Trends in GE Adoption, supra note 7.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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B. Risks of GMO Under-Regulation of GMOs
Under-Regulation of GMOs, favoring the alleged free-trade
view, prioritizes profitability of agriculture over other important
considerations, such as public health, socio-economic, and direct
and indirect environmental effects. In fact, a 2015 review study
published in Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment examined
“the direct and indirect trait-specific effects of GM plants,
microbes, and animals on ecosystem processes” and concluded
“that most of the effects of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
on ecosystem processes are indirect and are the result of associated
changes in management strategy rather than a direct effect of the
GMOs.”48 The researchers from the Swedish University of
Agricultural Sciences explain that “manipulated traits may
introduce unforeseen effects on ecological processes, and there is a
possibility of trade-offs at the genetic, physiological or ecological
level that constrain the opportunities for improving resource-use
management using modern biotechnology.”49 They also found that
“the adoption of novel transgenic plants, animals, and microbes in
agricultural systems globally may have potentially large impacts
at [the] ecosystem level.”50 Those impacts mainly affect net
production, nutrient cycling, greenhouse gas fluxes, biodiversity,
and crop-weed and trophic interactions.51 Thus, “knowledge of
their sustainable use and environmental impact is crucial,” but for
HT and Bt crops, the most studied GM crops’ “direct effects of GM
traits are rare and effects on ecosystem processes have seldom
been documented.”52
Most of the effects of GMOs on ecosystem processes that have
been reported to date are indirect, appearing to rely on complex,
multi-trophic interactions, and are primarily a consequence of
changes in agricultural practices associated with, for example, the

48. Anna-Karin Kolseth et al., Influence of Genetically Modified Organisms
on Agro-Ecosystem Processes, 214 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 96, 96 (2015),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281559358_Influence_of_genetically_
modified_organisms_on_agro-ecosystem_processes [https://perma.cc/GJ6M-UN
93].
49. Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 102.
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use of HT and insect-resistant crops.53 The Swedish researchers
identified knowledge gaps and highlighted the “urgent need for
basic ecological and agronomic research on the impacts of traits
(modified with conventional methods or GM) on ecosystem
processes in order to evaluate the possible effects of GMOs in an
appropriate setting.”54 Precisely this knowledge gap lies between
the European precautionary and the US-American biotechnology
approaches in regulating GE crops. In short, the US evaluates
risks from GMOs as products and asks “what is made?” while the
EU’s approval process of GMOs is process-oriented, asking “how is
it made?” The resulting dissonance is at the heart of the solution
proposed herein, respecting both approaches and suggesting a
bridge to allow both to coexist.
In the US, GMOs are regulated under the Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, which “was
promulgated by the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy in 1986 to address the budding biotechnology industry.”55
The Framework was designed to institute a “comprehensive
federal regulatory policy” for GM research and products, and
specified that GM products would be regulated under then-existing
laws and regulations instead of developing new laws to address the
new technology.56 The basis for this policy was the government’s
conclusion that GM products are not fundamentally different from
non-GM products or inherently risky, and thus the final product of

53. It should also be noted that,
many of the published reports on the effects of GMOs are descriptive
and lack functional-mechanistic analyses aiming at the causal relationships between organismal traits and relevant ecosystem processes
in agro-ecosystems or of importance for natural resource management. The focus of most investigations is on risk assessment at species
level without considering an ecosystem perspective. There are also numerous conflicting results on the performance and environmental effects of GM crops, especially with regard to effects on crop yield and
impacts on non-target organisms. It has previously been pointed out
that this type of data is inconclusive or contradictory and that any
discussion on the potential of GM crops needs to take these complex
results into account.
Id. (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 102.
55. Czarnezki & Montgomery, supra note 18, at 99.
56. Id.
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biotechnology should be regulated, rather than the process of
creating GM products.57
The three agencies responsible for GMO regulation under the
Framework are the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA).58 In short, the FDA oversees what is safe
to eat, the USDA oversees what is safe to grow, and the EPA
oversees what is safe for the environment. Notably, the USDA has
primary authority over all GE plants “except those that are pestprotected” and “oversees the interstate movement, import, field
testing . . . and generally ensures that they are safe to grow.”59
USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS),
under the authority of the Plant Protection Act (PPA), mandates
that USDA’s APHIS oversights prevents the release and spread of
“plant pests,” broadly defined as organisms “that can injure or
cause disease or damage (directly or indirectly) in or to any plants
or plant parts,”60 commonly known as “weeds.” None of the
agencies directly address questions of food issues with climate
change, nor do they help streamline and decentralize the system
as a whole.
Environmental scholars have repeatedly lamented that, “as
a result of the policy set out in the Framework, no single law
directly addresses GM plants or GM products in general. Instead,
as many as 12 statutes, a myriad of regulations, and five different
agencies and services play a role in governing GM products.”61 All
of the regulatory oversight in the cracks and crevices left behind
an ever-stronger Biotech and BigAg lobby yields several risks that
remain unaccounted for from the regulatory and legal point of
view. Environmental risks from GE crops include the possibility
that GM plants or traits give rise to superweeds resistant to
herbicides, that insects become resistant to Bt crops or pesticides
used in synchrony with GM crops, reduced biodiversity, the effects
of GM crops and the associated chemicals on non-target
organisms,62 i.e other wildlife and plants, monoculture cultivation
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Czarnezki & Montgomery, supra note 18.
Id.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2012)).
Id. at 99.
Id. at 97.
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and the land use, soil depletion, freshwater waste for irrigation,
and fossil-fuel-dependent intensive agriculture associated with
GM cropping. The cumulative effects of these policies lack in
convergence.
C. Free Trade Versus Protectionism
This paper seeks to examine the nuances between the two
opposing views of free trade versus protectionism in international
food trade,63 specifically focusing on the problem of GMO
regulation, where BigAg has benefitted from the tension of these
competing regulatory views and consolidated food systems. On the
one hand, as Professor Michael Roberts from UCLA Law School
explains, the free trade view expects that “the expansion of food
trade is good for consumers, farmers, and the United States as a
whole,” and “that consumers have come to expect the world food
system to provide them with a wide choice of products and that
changes in consumer taste have encouraged the emergence of
global markets and added to the significance of trade.”64 Moreover,
subscribers to the free trade view “posit[] that trade enables
farmers to build markets for surplus food and has helped maintain
in the United States a competitive domestic food market” and base
their opinion “on a market model in which food trade between the
United States and other countries flows without restrictions
imposed by government.”65
The expansion of GMOs and the underlying trade have,
however, undermined this view in creating trade distortions,
which, in turn “create more universal problems, such as food
insecurity, social unrest, unsustainable food production,
environmentally harmful farming, and political uncertainty.”66 As
a result of distorted trade of GE crops, specifically of commodity
crops, global food distribution has become ineffective.67 Through
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), which are “deep integration
63. See MICHAEL ROBERTS, FOOD LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 57 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2016).
64. Id. (internal citations omitted).
65. Id.
66. Steier, supra note 23, at 1.
67. YING CHEN, TRADE, FOOD SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE RULES FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND THE EVOLVING WORLD
FOOD CRISIS 73 (Routledge 2014).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2

16

2017]

GMO REGULATION THROUGH CAP-AND-TRADE 309

partnerships between countries or regions with a major share of
world trade and foreign direct investments,”68 highly-productive
nations, such as the US, “often fail to address the inequalities of
trading partners and miss the important goal of trading
governments to ensure food security.”69 As such, the everexpanding BigAg network spans not only agriculture and trade,
but also policy and socio-economic aspects of many nations.
On the other side of the spectrum, competing with the liberal
free trade is the notion that uncontrolled “expansion of food trade
threatens food safety, food security, farms and food enterprises, the
environment, and culture” because unrestricted “food trade
encapsulates the inequity between the industrialized nations and
the poorer, predominantly rural countries.”70 This protectionist
vision for food trade envisions a fair distribution of importing and
exporting countries and crops, rather than a centralized and lopsided BigAg-dominated grid where the haves and haves not, as
Ernest Hemingway once put it,71 compete in one global market to
the detriment of the latter. Consequently, while “[t]hose who
oppose trade liberalization of food favor restrictions to trade,”72 as
Professor Roberts explains, the problem is more nuanced, as
illustrated by the GMO-focus of this paper. Stepping back and
simplifying the tension to a mere clash to free trade versus
protectionism is an oversimplification prone to misinterpretation
and lobbyist abuse in favor of either end of the spectrum. With the
BigAg lobby pouring $94,282,881 in 2016 alone73 to control the
discourse and policy, one must steer clear of these pitfalls and
traps from logical fallacies so often abused by the industry.74
Instead of the mere clash between the free trade and protectionist,
68. Call for Papers: 2016 AgLaw Colloquium, INST. LAW, POLI. & DEV. (Oct.
20, 2016), http://www.santannapisa.it/it/event/2016-aglaw-colloquium [https://pe
rma.cc/45WL-R4FT],
69. Steier, supra note 23, at 2.
70. ROBERTS, supra note 63, at 57.
71. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, TO HAVE AND HAVE NOT (1937).
72. Id.
73. Sector Profile, 2016: Annual Lobbying for Agribusiness, OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=A
[https://perma.cc/JX7V-T4
S9].
74. THE GMO DECEPTION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE FOOD,
CORPORATIONS, AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PUTTING OUR FAMILIES AND OUR
ENVIRONMENT AT RISK (Sheldon Krimsky & Jeremy Gruber eds., 2014)
[hereinafter THE GMO DECEPTION].
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the actual subject matter of trade must therefore be considered
alongside the public health, socio-economic, and environmental
effects to ensure a well-rounded analysis.
D. GMO Regulation in the EU
By comparison to the US, European GMO regulation is largely
streamlined and follows the aforementioned precautionary
principle through EU Directives on point. “In 1990, the European
Council adopted Directive 90/220/EEC on the Deliberate Release
of Genetically Modified Organisms,” taking “a process rather than
product-oriented approach”75 like the US Framework. Notably, the
Directive’s language is in stark contrast to the US Framework,
where the Directive notes that it is “based on the principle that
preventive action should be taken . . . whereas the effects of such
releases on the environment may be irreversible” and where “the
protection of human health and the environment requires that due
attention be given to controlling risks from the deliberate release
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment.”76
Notably, its preamble already establishes that “case-by-case
environmental risk assessment should always be carried out prior
to a release,”77 taking the “better safe than sorry” approach as
opposed to the US counterpart’s “safe until proven unsafe” dogma.
Other Directives on point are Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on
genetically modified food and feed78 and Implementing Regulation
503/2013 on applications for authorisation of genetically modified
food and feed.79 Both of these regulations give the European Food
Safety Authority (EFSA) authority over GMOs and set forth a
rigorous safety assessment, including the procedures for
evaluation and authorisation of GM foods and feeds,80 which are
largely banned and barely cultivated in the EU.
In June 2015, EFSA published a new guidance clarifying the
data needs for the agronomic and phenotypic characterisation of

75. Id.
76. Council Directive 1990/220, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15 (EC).
77. Id.
78. Commission Regulation 1829/03, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1 (EU).
79. Commission Regulation 503/13, 2013 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EU).
80. Genetically Modified Organisms, EUR. FOOD SAFETY AUTH., https://
www.efsa.europa.eu/en/topics/topic/gmo [https://perma.cc/FUM4-V6GW].

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2

18

2017]

GMO REGULATION THROUGH CAP-AND-TRADE 311

GM plants.81 The document complements existing guidance on
data requirements for the risk assessment of GM plants. “It gives
applicants seeking market approval for a GM plant in the
European Union recommendations on how to generate, analyse
and interpret agronomic and phenotypic data of the GM plant.”82
Interestingly, the 2015 “guidance proposes a comprehensive and
harmonised approach for the agronomic and phenotypic
characterisation of GM plants, which should ensure the best use of
agronomic and phenotypic data for the comparative analysis of GM
plants and derived food and feed products, and for their food and
feed and environmental risk assessment.”83 This guidance alone
illustrates that EFSA acknowledges and is aware of the risks that
GMOs pose, leading to a near zero-tolerance of GMOs in the
European market – a stark contrast to the US approach.
Putting all of this into context, the EU essentially up-regulates
GMOs while the US down-regulates GMOs. This divergence is in
part due to agricultural exceptionalism in the US and can only be
overcome if agriculture is positioned within environmental law and
the climate change discussion about resilient food production and
food integrity. The reason why the US has historically down- and
under-regulated GMOs is a function of its agricultural
exceptionalism, the very policy allowing special status for food
producers.
E. Agricultural Exceptionalism and GMO DownRegulation in the US
Agricultural exceptionalism is the point at which food and
agriculture law diverge. Agricultural law,84 rooted in Jeffersonian
elitism, has been distorted into a system reminiscent of nepotism
from long passed feudal and colonial regimes, based on the societal
81. EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, Guidance on the
Agronomic and Phenotypic Characterisation of Genetically Modified Plants,
13 EFSA J. 44 (2015).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. “Agricultural law can be defined as the study of the network of laws and
policies that apply to the production, marketing, and sale of agricultural products,
i.e., the food we eat, the natural fibers we wear, and increasingly, the bio-fuels
that run our vehicles.” Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural
Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935 (2010).
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goal to preserve and protect farms. It is the basis for the
conglomerates of multi-national companies—BigAg—which shape
the multi-lateral food trade, thereby controlling large aspects of
agriculture world-wide. As Professor Roberts explains, “examples
of agricultural exceptionalism via the law include protections
afforded to farmers in labor, bankruptcy, and international trade;
exceptions to environmental and antitrust regulations; and
programs based on subsidies, loans, and education.”85 Scholars
have called for a “reconsideration of agricultural law and policy to
address the unique aspects of agricultural production, the fragility
of the environment, and the fundamental need for healthy food,”86
but the legislature has not responded to satisfy the demands of food
lawyers. Distinguishable from agriculture law, food law is
practiced by those learned colleagues exploring the intersection of
law and food, in terms of how food sustains life, affects the quality
of life, shapes societies, and manifests cultural values.87 Food
lawyers hold the law accountable for the five topics it covers,
commerce, safety, marketing, nutrition, and systems,88 all of which
are complex and connected. Thus, while agricultural law largely
represents farms and agricultural enterprises, food law concerns
itself with the safe and sustainable production of food in a manner
that ensures the highest possible quality of life in a more holistic
approach, considering food security, food sovereignty, biodiversity,
and ecologic systems at large. The point of divergence and friction
between agricultural law and food law is simply the premise that
exceptionalism should not be a permissible lair of BigAg’s
externalized costs.89
Domestic GMO policy has taken a pro-industry approach,
down-regulating the agricultural sector to benefit BigAg’s cost
externalization practices. As asserted by the FAO and other
organizations:
agricultural biotechnology will be important to meet global
nutritional needs in 2050. Many countries have responded to this
challenge, allowing agricultural biotechnology innovations to be
85. ROBERTS, supra note 63, at 6-7.
86. Schneider, supra note 84, at 935.
87. ROBERTS, supra note 63, at 2.
88. Id.
89. See Gabriela Steier, Externalities in Industrial Food Production: The
Costs of Profit, 9(3) DARTMOUTH L.J. 163 (2011).
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commercialized as part of their strategic response to the FAO
challenge. While Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and the
USA have all approved the production of GM crops, few developing
countries have followed suit.90

Even peer-reviewed scientific journals fall prey to the
misunderstandings about GMO safety, criticizing the EU for its
progressive, precautionary, and effective approach to ban GMOs.91
However, even Europe’s ban is not absolute. In fact, Monsanto’s
Maize MON 810 is the only GE crop that has been approved in the
EU.92 Between its approval in 1998 and the expiration of the
license in 2013, 150,000 hectares have been planted with MON
810, with 91.3 percent in Spain alone.93 The European Parliament
News reported that GMOs are banned in Germany, Austria,
Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Greece and Italy, and
predicts that “it is possible that other countries could follow
suit.”94
The debate over GMOs on a governance level continues. In
fact, “the European Commission is proposing to give member
states the power to ban the commercialisation of GMOs on their
territory, even if they have already been approved at EU level.”95
However, members of the European parliament rejected the
proposal for “fear it could prove unworkable and lead to border
controls between countries that disagree on GMOs, which would
affect the internal market.”96 The EU imports most of its GE
soybeans from the US, Brazil, and Argentina but products
containing more than 0.09 percent of GMOs must be labeled in the
EU,97 thereby shifting the risk assessment partially to consumers.
Thus, the debate over GMOs centers around the utility versus the
need, on the one hand, and the possible risks and reserves, on the
90. Stuart J. Smyth et al., EU Failing FAO Challenge to Improve Global
Food Security, 34 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 521, 521 (2016).
91. See generally THE GMO DECEPTION, supra note 74.
92. Eight Things you Should know About GMOs, EUR. PARLIAMENT NEWS
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20151013ST
O97392/eight-things-you-should-know-about-gmos [https://perma.cc/KK4S-QY
R5].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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other hand.98 As long as the proliferation of GMOs continues to be
trivialized by their mass production, BigAg’s business remains
guarded under agricultural exceptionalism.
From a European perspective, agricultural exceptionalism
resembles an artificial construct:
[o]ver the years, the boundary between the species is broken and
new varieties are introduced, for example, a gene of the pig in a
tomato, a firefly gene into a tobacco plant and a human gene into
a bull. The killing of the natural boundaries between species, the
unpredictability of long-term effects and irreversibility of the potential environmental consequences are among the main risks associated with GMO[s].99

Notably, in a telling and suspicious lack of studies on point,
“the review articles published in international scientific journals
during the current decade did not find . . . references concerning
human and animal toxicological/health risks studies on GM
foods.”100 “It is therefore important that the legislation on GMOs
in the EU and its Member States, in many third countries and in
international treaties be based on this reality.”101
III. THE SOLUTION
A.

Cap-and-Trade in Climate Change Policy and GE
Commodity Crops

If commodity crops, specifically the most commonly traded
GMOs, were regulated under a cap-and-trade scheme borrowed
from climate change regulation, a system shift toward improved
food integrity might result. In a cap-and-trade regulatory model, a
government sets a limit on the quantity of GHG emissions,
distributes permits for allowable emissions that add up to the cap,
and enables firms to buy and sell the permits after the initial
distribution.102 Regulated sources must pay allowances at the end
98. Margherita Arcieri, Spread and Potential Risks of Genetically Modified
Organisms, 8 AGRIC. & AGRIC. SCI. PROCEDIA 552, 554 (2016).
99. Id.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. Id.
102. HARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND
POLICY 34-35 (2012).
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of a given period equal to their emissions,103 but ultimately strive
to stay within the cap. The price for emission allowances (the
carbon price) is determined by supply and demand for allowances
in an emissions trading market.104
Applied to GE crop trades, governments concerned with the
environmental and food safety risks of GMOs could cap the
quantities of crops that may be distributed, creating an
environment similar to the GHG trading model under the Paris
Agreement. Briefly, under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), GHG emissions are
traded like commodities105 – hence the parallel to the GMO trading
proposal. Here, the regulated sources would be easily traceable
food conglomerates, such as the major GE seed producing
companies and BigAg’s main players. At the end of a given period,
GMO producers and sellers would essentially have to stay below a
certain maximum amount of GMOs that may be traded, thereby
either keeping GMOs for domestic use or reducing production
overall. The advantage of keeping the GMOs for domestic use puts
the brunt of the cap-and-trade scheme on the major producing
countries: US, Brazil, and Argentina.106 As a consequence of the
reduced export, price volatility may directly or indirectly enable
the second benefit of this scheme, reducing GMO production
overall, thereby forcing farmers to diversify their crops. Supply and
demand for GMOs would thus dwindle and potentially make room
for crop diversification and more sustainable alternatives of
agriculture. The commodity crop trading market would
consequently become more varied and create opportunities for
agro-ecologic farming to push BigAg’s market dominance aside,
thereby decentralizing the market further.
Refining the commodity-crop cap-and trade scheme further,
the upstream alternative, as opposed to the downstream version,
lends itself to this scenario. Again, borrowing from climate change
policy,
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. International Emissions Trading, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trad
ing/items/2731.php [https://perma.cc/3BFR-BBED].
106. Countries Growing GMOs, GMO COMPASS (Jan. 19, 2007), http://www.
gmo-compass.org/eng/agri_biotechnology/gmo_planting/142.countries_growing_
gmos.html [https://perma.cc/J2TL-XPB5].
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an upstream cap-and-trade (UCT) system applies to fuel suppliers and requires them to surrender allowances equivalent to the
carbon content of fossil fuels they distribute. . . . This option has
the advantage of being relatively simple, and it covers the entire
economy. Analyses have shown that it would be environmentally
efficient, minimize economic costs to the economy, be manageable
administratively, and link easily to domestic and international offset programs.107

Here, the commodity crop UCT would apply to GE crop
producers and their supply chains, including pesticide, herbicide,
and chemical fertilizer producers, down to the distributors of fossilfuel dependent machinery upon which industrial agriculture
relies, covering the entire economy. Food lawyers might argue that
more environmentally friendly alternatives would ensue if the
BigAg system were weakened through such a UCT.
B. An Upstream Cap-and-Trade (UCT) Model for GE
Commodity Crops
The premise of the UCT model lies in its simplicity. As long as
the goal is to create market forces that those countries following
the precautionary approach, such as the EU, need is to shift food
systems away from industrial agriculture and toward agroecology,
thereby diversifying the commodity crop market by creating
opportunities to compete with non-GMO crops, the UCT model is a
powerful tool to create opportunities for improvement. Juxtaposing
the business-as-usual model (Figure 2) with the market
mechanisms and feedback loops of the UCT model (Figure 3)
highlights how powerful the simple limitations of the cap are.

107. OSOFSKY & MCCALLISTER, supra note 102, at 35.
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Figure 2: Business as Usual Scenario
The business as usual graph illustrates factors contributing to the
centralization of the food system and its relationship to trade in GE
commodity crops. From left to right, GMO producers (BigAg) use
substantial resources, which appear in boxes on the far left. These inputs
include pesticides, herbicides and chemical fertilizers, machinery and
fossil fuels, natural resources, labor, land acreage and others. As noted
above, the production of GE commodity crops is inextricably intertwined
with the industrial agriculture and monocultures, thereby depleting
resources and causing environmental harm (see curved arrows in the
center). Other side effects of GMO production and processing are
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), which are considered pollution and
further environmentally harmful practices. For the reason that the
business and usual model illustrates the centralized food system, it also
shows the food safety and food security risks, thereby impairing food
integrity. Together, the side effects shows through the curved arrows are
externalized costs, creating socioeconomic burdens that are borne by the
public and aggravated through the environmental harm. Overall, this is
how GMO producers can create a profit margin and export commodity
crops (see the long horizontal arrow), and dump surplus on importing
countries. Notable here is the lack of defenses of importing countries.
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Figure 3: GE Commodity Crop Upstream Cap-and-Trade
Model
This is a snapshot illustrating the effects of the upstream cap-and-trade
model once the caps, maximum allowances under the caps, have been
reached and the positive effects of the limitation accrue. When the curved
grey arrow representing GE commodity crop trade hits the cap (shown as
a black crescent line in the center), a shift in side effects and trade impacts occurs. In this upstream cap-and-trade model, GMO producers are
forced to internalize the costs of production, thereby accounting for all the
inputs (boxed terms in the far left). Consequently, the GMO producers
have control to mitigate the risks (curved arrows), such as food safety and
food security, GHG emissions, resource depletion, and environmental
degradation. For the reason that there is only output (long black arrow in
the center) if the GMO producers internalize the costs of production, there
is diminished and controlled GMO export and trade. A balance of profit
and internalization of risk ensues, lifting the socioeconomic burden on the
importing countries. The diminished and controlled GMO export and
trade creates a window of opportunity to use domestic resources because
these importing parties are less reliant on imports, thereby encouraging
domestic crop diversification. Notable here is the presence of defenses
(crescent line in the center) of importing countries and the beneficial side
effects (illustrated through light grey looping arrows in the far right.
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C. Evaluating a GMO Regulatory Model Borrowed from
Climate Change Policy
Escalating food law beyond solely food safety issues quickly
delves deeply into the realm of environmental sustainability and,
inherently to the environmental discourse, into questions of climate change contributions of the food and agriculture sector. Food
production in the US alone accounts for 20% of overall fossil fuel
consumption,108 where it takes 30.3 liters of gas to till one hectare
of land today with a 50 horsepower tractor, fossil fuel inputs that
are directly linked to the carbon emissions going into the atmosphere.109 Industrial agriculture and GMO cultivation in monocultures contributes to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—and
thereby to global temperature rises110—as demonstrated by high
certainty evidence corroborated by the United Nation’s panels of
experts—the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC)—who published these findings in their most recent reports.
Specifically, the IPCC found that the agricultural “sector is responsible for just under a quarter (~10–12 GtCO2eq/year) of anthropogenic GHG emissions, mainly from deforestation and agricultural
emissions from livestock, soil and nutrient management,”111 factors overlapping with the inputs highlighted in Figures 2 and 3.
Tackling the agricultural sector, however, is particularly promising because, as the IPCC concluded, “the mitigation potential is
derived from both an enhancement of removals of greenhouse
gases (GHG), as well as reduction of emissions through management of land and livestock.”112 It follows that the links between
food production and climate change already exist and that the subject lends itself to comparison to find solution to shared environmental concerns.
The major benefit of the cap-and-trade model is the decentralization of the food system, which would have a positive ripple effect

108. Jason J. Czarnezki & Elisa K. Prescott, Environmental and Climate
Impacts of Food Production, Processing, Packaging, and Distribution, in FOOD,
AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 18, at 115.
109. Id. at 117.
110. Id.
111. Pete Smith et al., Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 816 (2014).
112. Id.
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on the agricultural sector, allowing agroecology to surge and mitigate some effects of climate change. Under the proposed model,
BigAg would only be able to grow and continue to export its products if they diversified their crops, away from the four major
GMOs: corn, wheat, soy, and rice. As such, to stay competitive in
the free market economy,113 BigAg would, in theory, shift its focus
to other types of crops. A logical consequence of this development
would be that BigAg might genetically engineer and patent other
types of crops, eventually expanding the centralized food system to
more than the four major commodity crops. The problem of the centralized food system would not directly be solved. Nonetheless, indirectly decentralizing food systems by capping GMOs would destabilize the trade paths for a certain period, providing the moment
that many existing producers of other crops might need. Thus,
gearing up to enter international markets and interrupting existing import and export patterns would create opportunities for nonBigAg producers to seize parts of the food system, thereby decentralizing the system. It is the window of opportunity114 for the underdogs of the food system to take the long shots of entering a market that is otherwise dominated by BigAg and seemingly
impermeable. Through the UCT implementation, an otherwise unattainable opportunity is created that, if used mindfully, forces
BigAg to internalize the cost of production along with the associated risks of GMO production, giving others the chance to enter
the market and compete with other crops.
Other benefits include policy incentives, where legislators
would be empowered to advocate for the underdogs, stripping some
lobbying power away from BigAg as soon as the caps are reached.
Environmental organizations and concerned members of the public
might applaud proactive and well-targeted caps that strengthen

113. See generally Chris Seabury, Free Markets: What’s The Cost?,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/free-marketregulation.asp?ad=dirN&qo=serpSearchTopBox&qsrc=1&o=40186&lgl=bnullbaseline-below-content [https://perma.cc/SSQ5-MUZZ] (outlining positives and
negatives of free market economy system).
114. A window of opportunity is defined as “a short time period during which
an otherwise unattainable opportunity exists. After the window of opportunity
closes, the opportunity ceases to exist.” Window of Opportunity, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/window-of-opportunity.asp#ixzz4VLwSWe
Dj [https://perma.cc/96Y6-TQ5P].

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2

28

2017]

GMO REGULATION THROUGH CAP-AND-TRADE 321

local economies and force producers to internalize the costs of production rather than externalizing them to the public at large, as
depicted in Figure 3.
In practice, any UCT implementation should be incremental,
for only staggered momenta can accumulate to the positive effects
proposed in this model. Simply put, policy makers should create
several caps occurring over an extended period of time, repeating
the snapshot illustrated in Figure 3, with the goal to tap the UCT
benefits over and over and for various crops. Although the predictions in this paper are speculative and far from all encompassing,
the ideas presented will hopefully nudge policy makers in the right
direction. In fact, the results might play out in various scenarios,
the most beneficial of which would result in weakened margins for
the most commonly and widely traded GE commodity crops, bringing the reliance of the industrialized agriculture and GMO monocultures to stagnation. Eventually, resource depletion and environmental degradation could be slowed, creating yet another window
of opportunity for agroecology115 to assume a large role in international food production. In other words, enacting caps and repeating
the UCT process visualized in Figure 3 facilitates food integrity
improvements on a large scale, relying on agroecology.
Resuming the comparative analysis of the UCT model, taking
a precautionary approach has, indeed, risk-aversion potential. For
instance, in food systems, the US is taking the biotech principle,
which permits food to be marketed until it is proven unsafe.116 In
the EU, however, the precautionary approach only allows foods to
be marketed that have been proven safe,117 as noted above. This
illustrates two ends of a spectrum, with a gap between them, where
115. For the purpose of this paper, agroecology is defined as the symbiotic
relationship of agriculture and ecology, a harmonious blend of practices that
ensure sustainable, environmentally friendly, safe and transparent food
production. Agroecology shall be understood to be the opposite of industrial,
resource-intensive agriculture and monoculture. This is the author’s own
definition of agroecology, a definition which she is further developing in her
upcoming book AGROBIODIVERSITY AND AGROECOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL
RESILIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL FOOD LAW.
116. Biotechnology Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=AGRICULTURE&conte
ntid=BiotechnologyFAQs.xml [https://perma.cc/2MXM-7NNQ].
117. See generally Food Law General Principles, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.euro
pa.eu/food/safety/general_food_law/principles/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/G4
TE-BPHT].
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certain potentially unsafe foods are marketed in the US, but not in
the EU. Although this comparison is highly simplified, it shows
how national and regional policy approaches can affect a whole system. For instance, those potentially unsafe foods that are not permitted in the EU may, nonetheless, be imported from the US and,
thereby, enter the European market, making it difficult for European legislators and policy makers to prevent this cross-contamination.118
The same cross-contamination can happen in climate policy
when different nations take incompatible approaches to regulating
factors that contribute to climate change, offsetting each other’s
efforts. However, the efforts to mitigate, combat and adapt to climate change must be priorities in policy approaches around the
world and taking a precautionary approach may aid to use the
available data are more serious warning signs. According to the
European Commission, the precautionary principle established
common guidelines and “enables rapid response in the face of a
possible danger to human, animal or plant health, or to protect the
environment.”119 Thus, this precautionary approach may require
that the climate change risks with medium and high levels of scientific certainty become guideposts for policy makers – until and
unless any risks to further aggravate climate change can be conclusively discounted (if ever).120
IV. CONCLUSION
An upstream regulation of GE commodity crops might decentralize food systems, thereby opening trade up for other crops. The
benefits reach along the supply and distribution chains, eventually
favoring agroecology approaches over industrial agriculture and
monocultures. The UCT model, however, is limited in that it represents a snapshot momentum that creates a window of opportunity for agroecology to compete with BigAg’s food trade dominance. If this window of opportunity is not seized, BigAg will
simply diversify its supply and thereby control the demand in the
118. The ideas in this paragraph were sparked by assignments in Professor
Tracy Bach’s Climate Change Policy course at Vermont Law School (Spring 2016).
119. The Precautionary Principle, EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al32042 [https://perma.cc/VMA4-N346] (last
updated Nov. 30, 2016).
120. See Food Law General Principles, supra note 117.
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free market tradition. From the European perspective, the caps on
GE commodity crops may validate the precautionary protectionism
and relieve some of the pressures posed by the US-dominated free
trade and biotechnology dogma. Overall, incremental caps could
turn into powerful tools to restore and conserve food integrity.

31

